University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2014

"Why Won't My Homeowners Insurance Cover
My Loss?": Reassessing Property Insurance
Concurrent Causation Coverage Disputes
Peter N. Swisher
University of Richmond, pswisher@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter Nash Swisher, "Why Won't My Homeowners Insurance Cover My Loss?": Reassessing Property Insurance Concurrent Causation
Coverage Disputes, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 515 (2014)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

"Why Won't My Homeowners Insurance
Cover My Loss?": Reassessing Property
Insurance Concurrent Causation
Coverage Disputes
Peter Nash Swisher*
Property insurance coverage disputes can be extremely complex cases when there are
multiple concurrent causes in a causal cha.in of events and when some of these concurrent
causes are covered under the policy language but other concurrent causes are excluded fivm
coverage. To complicate matters enonnously, there are no fewer than three different judicial
approaches attempting to resolve this concurrent causation interpretive conundrum. Over the
past two decades, a number ofproperty insurance companies have attempted to address this
interpretive problem contmctua.lly by inserting so-called anti-concurrent causation clauses into
their property insurance policy language. But these anti-concurrent causation clauses have
engendered unintended and unexpected interpretive consequences of their own that have not
been adequately explored by the courts or commentators. The purpose of this Article is to
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the various interpretive approaches in resolving
property insurance concurrent causation coverage disputes and to suggest six policyholder
defenses to combat the ofien unchallengedjudicial acceptance ofsuch anti-concurrent causation
clauses in property insurance policies.

Language of causation [in insurance policies] is simple, but it disguises
extremely complex and diflicult legal questions. This difliculty has led to a
1
pro!Usion ofinconsistent cases on remarkably similar facts.
Concurrent causation cases are the most costly, ineflicien~ tortured and
unpredictable ofinsurance cases. . . . It is diflicult !Or insurers and insureds alike
to 81T811ge their insurance and indeed, their veiy conduc~ around shilling standards
2
!Or resolving these disputes.
The danger with the anticoncurrent causation clause is that it could in
theoiy tempt an insurer to take it to an unreasonable extreme, which in tum could
cause a court to overreact and construe the clause too narrowly, creating an
3
undesirable precedent
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INTRODUCTION

Homeowners insurance and other property insurance coverage
disputes can be extremely complex when there are multiple concurrent
causation issues in a causal chain of events that result in a loss and
when some of those concurrent causes are covered under the policy
language but other concurrent causes are excluded from coverage.4 To
complicate this interpretive conundrum further, there are no fewer than
three different judicial approaches to resolving property insurance
coverage disputes involving issues of concurrent causation. 5
Consequently, over the past two decades, a number of property
insurance companies, in order to limit these concurrent coverage
disputes, have unilaterally inserted so-called anti-concurrent causation
clauses into their policies that effectively limit a policyholder's right to
recover on insured losses for a number of explicitly excluded direct or
indirect concurrent causes. 6 However, these clauses have engendered a
number of their own unexpected consequences and created their own
interpretive coverage uncertainties, as illustrated in a number of
Hurricane Katrina (and more recently, Hurricane Sandy) concurrent
4.
See Douglas G. Houser, The Rise and Fall ofConcurrent Causation: Background
and Current Trends Affecting Property Insurance Coverage, 44 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNSEL
Q. 3, 4 (1993) ("Insurance claims departments, defense counsel, and the courts have long
wrestled with lawsuits concerning issues related to 'causes' of property insurance losses. The
greatest controversies occur where losses are caused by a combination of covered and
excluded perils."); Douglas G. Houser & Christopher H. Kent, Concurrent Causation in FirstParty Insurance Claims: Consumers Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS.
L.J. 573 (1985-86); Craig Litsey, Property Insurance Coverage and Policy Exclusions:
Problems ofMultiple Causation, 35 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 415 (1985); Mark D. Wuerfel &
Mark Koop, "Efficient Proximate Causation" in the Context ofProperty Insurance Claims,
65 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 400 (1998); Finley Harckham, Beware ofAnticoncurrent Causation
Clauses-They Can Erase }Our Property Insurance Coverage, POLICYHOLDER ADVISOR,
Mar./Apr. 2007, at l; Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation i-ersus
Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance. Coverage Analysis, BRIEF,
Winter 2007, at 32.
5.
See Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifjing Some Legal Causation "Riddles," 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 1,
25-27 (2007) [hereinafter Swisher, Causation Requirements]; Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance
Causation Issues: The Legacy ofBird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351,
369-71 (2002) [hereinafter Swisher, Causation Issues]; see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 1, at 536-39 (describing various judicial approaches).
See, e.g., INS. SERVS. OFFICE, HO 00 02 05 01, HOMEOWNERS 2-BROAD FORM
6.
(2008) [hereinafter BROAD FORM] ("We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following ...."). The Homeowners 3-Special Form [HO 00 03 04 91] states,
"We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is
excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence
to the loss." INS. SERVS. OmCE, HO 03 05 01, HOMEOWNERS 3-SPECIAL FORM (2008)
[hereinafter SPECIAL FORM].
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causation coverage disputes that a number of courts and academic
commentators have failed to address adequately.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of these different interpretive approaches for resolving
property insurance concurrent causation coverage disputes and to
suggest a realistic judicial approach for interpreting anti-concurrent
causation clauses in property insurance policies, including six
proposed policyholder defenses to the enforcement of these onerous
clauses. Part II of this Article presents an overview of causation
requirements in insurance coverage disputes, including a comparison
of tort and insurance law causation requirements, the evolution of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations in property insurance law, and the
interpretive clash of legal formalist courts versus legal functionalist
courts in interpreting and applying this doctrine of reasonable
expectations. Part ill of this Article discusses the three concurrent
causation interpretive rules that various courts currently employ, absent
an anti-concurrent causation clause found in the property insurance
policy itsel£ Part IV of this Article demonstrates the inconsistent
application of anti-concurrent causation clauses, with illustrations
from various Hurricane Katrina wind-versus-water decisions in
Mississippi and Louisiana federal district courts that were
subsequently questioned or reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. And Part V of this Article proposes six
policyholder defenses to the anti-concurrent causation clauses that are
found in many property insurance policies today.
II.

CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS IN INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

A.

A Comparison ofTort and Insurance Law Causation
Requirements

For the past four centuries, since Lord Chancellor Francis
Bacon's First Maxim of Law, "In Jure non remota causa, sed proxima
spectator,"' legal causation requirements have remained a crucial,
though often misunderstood, element of Anglo-American law.
For example, the prima facie elements of negligence in a tort law
action include the requirements that (1) the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of due care; (2) the defendant breached this duty of due
"In law not the remote cause, but the proximate, is looked to." Lord Chancellor
FRANCIS BACON 327
(James Spedding et al. eds., 1870).
7.

Bacon,

The Maxims of Law (1630), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF
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care; (3) the defendant's acts were the cause in fact and the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's loss, constituting a causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
8
damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's actions.
In contrast, the required elements for an insillance law cause of
action include ( 1) the coverage provisions of an insurance policy (or,
more generally, the promise of the contract), (2) the occurrence of the
event (or, more generally, the breach), (3) the loss or damage, and (4)
the causal "connector" between the event and the loss.9 So in both tort
law and insurance law there must be a necessary causal connection
between the occurrence and the loss.
Because most litigation, research, and analysis involving legal
10
causation has largely occurred in the context of tort law, many courts
have applied these classic tort cause-in-fact and proximate cause
12
principles 11 to insurance contract disputes as well.
Thus, as one commentator has noted:
Among the decided cases, it is generally taken to be beyond dispute
that proximate cause is proximate cause, whenever it may be found, and
the court is content with a brief definition in the traditional [tort]
manner. The rule in insurance cases appears to be that the definition of
proximate cause which should be applied is the same or substantially
13
the same as in negligence cases ....
8.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269-73 (2000); W PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 <Y/. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
9.
See Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV.
569, 575 (1988).
I 0. See LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE ( 1927); H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962); Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal
Cause, 60YALEL.J. 761 (1951); Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67YALEL.J. I (1957).
11. Causation in fact, or "but for" causation, generally involves a direct (as opposed
to an indirect or a remote) causal chain of events, without any intervening, superseding
causes. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 272-73; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS§ 435 (1965) (concluding an actor should be held liable if his action was a substantial
factor in causing harm, regardless of foreseeability). See generally Richard W Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1735 (1985) (discussing causation in tort law).
Proximate or legal causation is a limitation of liability based on public policy grounds,
involving concepts of foreseeable harm. Id at 1737.
12. Eg., Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CVOOI LTS-RHW, 2007 WL
912120 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2007); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash.
1989).
13. William Conant Brewer Jr., Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59
MICH. L. REv. 1141, 1167 (1961) (footnote omitted); see also JEFFREY w STEMPEL, STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 7.01-.03 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (discussing insurance law
causation doctrines). This is especially true in the context of liability insurance coverage
disputes, involving concurrent causation issues arising from automobile liability insurance
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In a tort law context, a substantial factor rule involving multiple
concurrent causation can be summarized as follows: if two or more
causes concur to bring about an event and either one of them,
operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause an identical
result, then each cause in fact has played so important a part in
producing the result that legal responsibility should be imposed upon it
as a substantial factor of the ultimate result, and there may be more
than one substantial factor in a causal chain of events. 14
Likewise, in an insurance law context, a number of courts have
applied this classic tort causal chain of events approach to insurance
coverage disputes, holding that "[w]here a peril specifically insured
against sets other causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence [of
events] between the act and final loss, produce the result for which
recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the 'proximate
cause' of the entire loss," and it is therefore "the efficient or
predominant cause which sets into motion the chain of events
producing the loss which is regarded as the proximate cause, [and] not
necessarily the last act in a chain of events." 15
However, there is also a substantial body of case law and legal
commentary demonstrating that there are important differences, as
well as similarities, between legal causation requirements in tort law
and insurance law, and that general rules of causation often are applied
in a different-and a more literal-manner in an insurance law context
than in a traditional tort action, especially involving property insurance
coverage disputes, as illustrated below. 16

and homeowners liability insurance. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514
P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
14. Restatement (Second) ofTorts section 431 states that an actor's negligent conduct
is a legal cause of harm to another if his or her conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm. See, e.g., Sharp v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 569 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1977);
Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 403 (Cal. 1999) ("[T]he substantial factor [test
for proving causation] is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of
[individual causes] be more than negligible or theoretical."); see also infra text accompanying
notes 47-49 (comparing the immediate cause rule to the dominant cause rule).
15.
See Graham v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983); see
also John Drennon & Sons Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 637 S.W2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(reasoning that "direct" is synonymous with "proximate" in insurance law).
16.
See, e.g., Sidney I. Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AM. Bus. L.J. 33
(1972); Harckham, supra note 4; Phillips & Coplen, supra note 4; Swisher, Causation Issues,
supra note 5.

2014]

B.

REASSESSING PROPERTY INSURANCE

521

Causation Requirements in Property Insurance Coverage
Disputes: The Legacy ofBird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. and the Evolution ofthe Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine

One crucial distinction between tort and property insurance
causation principles is the reasonable expectation of the parties
doctrine as an important interpretive factor in insurance causation
disputes, which was first enunciated in then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo 's seminal opinion in the property insurance causation case of
Bird v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.' 1
The Bird case involved a damaged maritime vessel, which was
insured under a fire and marine insurance policy by the St. Paul
Insurance Company. On the night of July 30, 1916, a fire of unknown
origin broke out beneath some railroad freight cars in New York
Harbor. 18 The railroad cars were loaded with explosives, and after the
fire had burned for approximately thirty minutes, the contents of the
cars exploded. This explosion caused an additional fire, which in turn
caused a much greater explosion of a large quantity of dynamite and
other explosives stored in the freight yard. This last explosion caused a
concussion of air, which damaged the plaintiff's vessel lying about
1000 feet distant in the harbor. No fire reached the vessel.
The question for Judge Cardozo in this particular case was
whether the damage to the vessel was covered under the St. Paul's
property insurance policy provision that provided coverage for a direct
loss caused by fire. 19 Judge Cardozo conceded that "[t]here is no
doubt that when fire spreads to an insured building and there causes an
explosion, the insurer is liable for all the damage,"20 and the trial court
had found for the plaintiff policyholder under a similar rationale. 21
Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo reversed and remanded judgment for the
defendant insurer in this particular case, largely based upon insurance
causation principles.
First, Judge Cardozo opined that the damage to the vessel
constituted "damage by concussion; and concussion is not fire nor the
immediate consequence of fire." 22 Then Judge Cardozo discussed the
important insurance law proximate cause issues involved in this case:
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
Id at 86.
Id
Id
Id at 87.
Id

522

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:515

We must put ourselves in the place of the average owner whose boat or
building is damaged by the concussion of a distant explosion, let us say
a mile away. Some glassware in his pantry is thrown down and broken.
It would probably never occur to him that, within the meaning of his
policy of insurance, he had suffered loss by fire. A philosopher or a
lawyer might persuade him that he had, but he would not believe it until
they told him. He would expect indemnity, of course, if fire reached the
thing insured. He would expect indemnity, very likely, if the fire was
near at hand, if his boat or his building was within the danger zone of
ordinary experience, if damage of some sort, whether from ignition or
from the indirect consequences of fire might fairly be said to be within
the range of normal apprehension. But a different case presents itself
when the fire is at all times so remote that there is never exposure to its
direct perils, and that exposure to its indirect perils comes only through
the presence of extraordinary conditions ....
The case comes, therefore, to this: Fire must reach the thing insured,
or come within such proximity to it that damage, direct or indirect, is
within the compass of reasonable probability. Then only is it the
proximate cause, because then only may we suppose that it was within
the contemplation of the [contracting parties] and not merely in the
physical bond of union between events, which solves, at least for the
23
jurist, this problem of causation.

Here, then, was the underlying rationale-and the genius-of
Judge Cardozo 's proximate cause analysis involving this property
insurance coverage dispute. Proximate cause in an insurance law
context should not always be determined solely through an objective
"classic tort" test of foreseeable harm. Rather, proximate cause in
insurance coverage disputes must also be determined according to the
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties:
"General
definitions of a proximate cause give little aid [in an insurance law
context]. Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the
ordinary business man when making an ordinary business contract. It
is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that counts."24
This evolutionary-some would say revolutionary-definition of
the proximate cause reasonable expectations doctrine in an insurance
law context, applicable to both the insured and the insurer alike,25
23. Id at 87-88.
24. Id (emphasis added); see also Swisher, Causation Issues, supra note 5, at 363-66
(discussing the rationale of the Biro case).
25. In a subsequent decision, Smith v. Northwestem Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
159 N.E. 87, 92 (N.Y. 1927), Judge Cardozo recognized that insurers as well as the insureds
could invoke this contractually based reasonable expectations doctrine. See Robert H. Jerry,
II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 32
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arguably was an important precursor to Professor Arthur Corbin's
famous first axiom of contract law: "The Main Purpose of Contract
Law is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by
Promises."26 This contractually based insurance law doctrine of
reasonable expectations has been developed and adopted successfully
by the vast majority of American courts over the past eighty years; and
in order to recognize the reasonable expectations of the parties to
coverage within this overarching contractual context, various rules of
insurance contract interpretation were formulated, recognized, and
incorporated into the case law of most American jurisdictions,
including (1) the contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities;
(2) contract unconscionability and public policy defenses; (3) the
application of certain equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable
estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and contract reformation; and
(4) additional interpretive rules applicable to standardized insurance
contracts of adhesion. 21
Indeed, this contractually based reasonable expectations doctrine
was firmly established by the time Professor (and later Judge) Robert
Keeton propounded his groundbreaking 1970 "rights at variance with
the policy language" reasonable expectations doctrine. 28 As proposed
by Professor Keeton, this functional (as opposed to contractual)
reasonable expectations doctrine is based upon a two-prong rationale:
(1) that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in
an insurance contract and (2) that the reasonable expectations of
insurance applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of
insurance coverage should be honored, even though a painstaking
study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated those
expectations. 29 Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine, at
variance with the insurance policy language, "suggests that an insured
(1998) ("Cardozo viewed reasonable expectations as a two-way street, as each party was
entitled to assert them as the other. Thus, in an insurance setting, Cardozo thought it as
important to consider the reasonable expectations of insurers as it was to examine the
[reasonable] expectations held by insureds.").
26.
ARTHUR LIN1DN CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1 (1952); GORDON D.
SCHARBER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 147 (3d ed. 1990) ("One
purpose of contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations of persons who have become
parties to a bargain."). See generally Jerry, supra note 25, at 42-50 (discussing the evolution
of this reasonable expectations doctrine).
See Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
27.
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INs. L.J. 729, 735-47 (2000) (explaining
insurance contract interpretation rules).
28.
Seeid
29.
See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions
(Pts. I & II), 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 963-77, 1281 (1970).
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can have reasonable expectations of coverage that arise from some
source otherthan the policy language itself, and that such an extrinsic
expectation can be powerful enough to override any policy provisions
no matter how clear."30 A minority of courts have adopted Professor
Keeton 's controversial reasonable expectations doctrine at variance
31
with the clear and unambiguous insurance policy language.
The first prong of Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations
doctrine, that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable
advantage in an insurance contract, can be justified in large part
through the depth and breadth of a more traditional, contractually
based reasonable expectations doctrine involving elements of contract
ambiguity, unconscionability, and waiver and estoppel principles,32 and
Professor Keeton himself wrote that this unconscionability principle
"explains much that is called waiver or estoppel in insurance law, in
circumstances involving neither voluntary relinquishment nor
detrimental reliance-the essence of waiver and estoppel respectively.
It also accounts for most of the distinctive controls over defenses based
on warranty, representation or concealment [and] the doctrine of
election."33 A majority of contemporary American courts and
commentators, therefore, generally recognize and apply this
unconscionability variant of Professor Keeton's reasonable
expectations doctrine in resolving insurance coverage disputes. 34
The second prong of Keeton's doctrine of reasonable
expectations, however, has been much more controversial-that the
reasonable expectations of the insured should be honored, even though
30. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
335 (1986).
31. See Stordahl v. GEICO, 564 P.2d 63, 66 (Alaska 1977); Otter v. Gen. Ins. Co. of
Am., 109 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837 (Ct. App. 1973); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Iowa 1975); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 26-27
(N.J. 1961); Hionis v. N. Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974), overruled by
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Arn. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1983). But see
Conduit & Found. Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 1053, 1058 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) ("While we look for the probable intent of the parties and their reasonable
expectations in construing insurance policies ... [w ]hen the language of an insurance policy
is clear, we must enforce its terms as written.").
32. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 1, at 148 ("[T]he doctrine's contours are
found precisely where Professor Keeton 'discovered' the doctrine-in the more traditional
[contractual] doctrines with which lawyers and judges are more familiar and comfortable.");
Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1175-77 ( 1981) (discussing
various equitable remedies); see also Rahdert, supra note 30, at 325-44 (discussing Professor
Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine).
33. Keeton, supra note 29, at 963-64.
34. See Swisher, supra note 27, at 764-65.
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a "painstaking study" of the policy provisions "would have negated
those expectations."35
Criticism of this Keeton reasonable expectation rights at variance
with the insurance policy language doctrine has been threefold. First,
under this controversial rights at variance with the insurance policy
language doctrine, the insurance policy need not be interpreted
according to its clear contractual language-which is anathema to a
traditional formalistic theory of insurance contract interpretation.36
Second, those courts that purportedly do apply this rights at variance
reasonable expectations approach have been unable to agree on what
specific factors actually constitute the insured's reasonable expectation
to coverage and what factors do not. 37 Third, a growing number of
commentators and courts have questioned the underlying doctrinal
justification purportedly supporting this rights at variance with the
policy language interpretive approach to insurance coverage disputes. 38

35. Id at 764. Moreover, various courts have split on how painstaking this judicial
study should be. See Rahdert, supra note 30, at 335-36 (discussing conflicting interpretations
of Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine).
36. See, e.g., ALLAN P. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6:3, at 6-95 to -96
(5th ed. 2007) ("The [Keeton] reasonable expectations rule, therefore, abandons the general
contract principle that the insured's legitimate expectations are necessarily governed and
limited by the terms of the policy. That principle will, instead, be applied only when it is fair
to do so. As a result, in a proper case, an insured may be held to be entitled to coverage
despite unambiguous language in the policy to the contrary. Unfortunately, however, the
courts have had little success in formulating a test for determining when equity necessitates
that the [Keeton] reasonable expectations rule be applied.").
37. Id; see, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 30, at 335 ("[T]he Keeton formula gives no hint
at what factors other than the policy provisions courts might use to define the 'terms' of the
insurance arrangement, or how the courts are to measure the force of these external factors
against the force of restrictive policy provisions to determine which should prevail in any
given instance."); see also Abraham, supra note 32, at 1153 ("The courts [purportedly
applying the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine] have employed the expectations
principle in cases where the insured's expectation of coverage was probably real and
reasonable. They have also employed it where an expectation of coverage was less probable,
but the policy's denial of coverage seemed unfair. Finally, they have relied on the principle
even where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the denial of coverage would not
appear unfair. In short, the judicial concept of an 'expectation' of coverage is not a
monolithic one." (footnotes omitted)).
38. See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations ls Indispensable,
If Hi' Only Knew Mat For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 179 (1998) (concluding that the Keeton
doctrine of reasonable expectations ''tells us so little about why courts decide coverage
disputes the way they do" with its primary deficiency being "the muting of decisional
accountability''); Peter Nash Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998)
(discussing opposing views of Professor Keeton's approach to insurance contract disputes);
Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique ofthe Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 333 (1998) (concluding that the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine
"rests on dubious assumptions" since "consumer research and empirical data tends to show
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Accordingly, a growing number of courts have severely
restricted---or expressly rejected-the Keeton rights at variance with
the insurance policy language doctrine of reasonable expectations,
while still recognizing a contractually based doctrine of reasonable
expectations, including the doctrine of ambiguities. 39 But how will the
reasonable expectations of the parties be interpreted by the courts in an
insurance coverage dispute? This depends largely on whether the
judge is a legal formalist or a legal functionalist as discussed in more
detail below.
C

Judicial Interpretations ofInsurance Coverage Disputes: Legal
Fonnalism itJSus Legal Functionalism-And a Consensus
"Middle Ground" Interpretive Approach

It is generally acknowledged that the interpretation of insurance
contract disputes is a function of the judge, as a matter of law, rather
than a function of the jury.40 But what interpretive principles should a
judge apply in order to resolve insurance coverage disputes?

that insureds do not rationally evaluate insurance information or arrive at specific expectations of coverage").
39. See Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Fann Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d
1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998) ("We decline to adopt the [Keeton] doctrine of reasonable
expectations. There is no need for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous because in
Florida ambiguities are construed against the insurer. To apply the doctrine to an
unambiguous provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the
premiums are charged." (footnote omitted)); see also Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656
N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (Ill. 1995) ('"[P]ublic policy does not require invalidation of clearly
written provisions simply to avoid disappointment to the insured."' (quoting Menke v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401N.E.2d539, 542 (Ill. 1980))); Liggatt v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 46
P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan. 2002) ("[A]mbiguity is a condition precedent to the application of the
reasonable expectations doctrine."); Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 787
(Mich. 2003) ("[T]he rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application when
interpreting an unambiguous contract because a policyholder cannot be said to have
reasonably expected something different from the clear language of the contract."); Jostens,
Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
insured's reasonable expectation to coverage must be "derived from the policy language, not
its own original expectations as it went into the insurance marketplace above"); Banfield v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 880 A.2d 373, 377 (N.H. 2005) ("We need not examine the parties'
reasonable expectations of coverage when a policy is clear and unambiguous."); Martin v.
Fanners Ins. Exch., 894 P.2d 618, 622 (Wyo. 1995) ("[C]onsumer expectations can hardly be
reasonable, by definition, if they are cultivated in contravention of clear and unambiguous
language contained within the contract of insurance."). See generally Swisher, supm note 2 7,
at 735-4 7 (discussing courts' varying applications of the doctrine of ambiguities).
40.
See Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1965) (holding that
insurance contract interpretation is "solely a judicial function ... unless the interpretation
turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence"); see also I STEVEN Purr ET AL., COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 21:3 (3d ed. 2013) ("[T]he construction and effect of a written contract of
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Over the past eight decades, formalist and functionalist judges
have battled over what Professor Robert Jerry calls "the heart and
soul" of insurance contract law:
On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose champions are
Professor Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts. The
formalists care mightily about texts and the four corners of documents.
They believe that words often have a plain meaning that exists
independently of any sense in which the speaker or writer may intend
the words. They insist that a court or a party can discern the meaning of
contractual language without asking about the intentions or [reasonable]
expectations of the parties. They contend that interpretation is
appropriate only if an ambiguity appears on the face of the
document. . . . In the world of the formalists, an insurer that drafts a
clear form should be entitled to rely on that form in setting rates without
worrying that a court will disregard the finely turned, clear
language ....
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the
functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the
realists, or the post-classicists. The champions of this side are Professor
Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The functionalists
care less about the text of [insurance] contracts, believing it to be most
useful as an articulation of the objective manifestations of the
contracting parties and as a means to understanding their intentions and
[reasonable] expectations. . . . Text does not have inherent meaning, but
text means what the drafter or speaker knows or should know the other
side will understand those words to mean in context. . . . Where a form
is standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable
expectations for whatever the particular recipient of the form
understood, given that the recipient has less reason to know what the
drafter means, while the drafter has insights into what the ordinary,
41
reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand.

Does this mean that an irreconcilable difference exists, and must
continue to exist, between formalist and functionalist courts in the
interpretation of insurance contract disputes? Not necessarily. As I
argued in a previous article:
Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston-was not willing to reject a
number of well-established rules of [insurance] contract interpretation
in pursuit of his more functional and contextual approach to contract
insurance is a matter of law, to be determined by the court and not by the jury." (footnote
omitted)).
See Jerry, supra note 25, at 55-56; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial
41.
Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Fonnal for the Function, 52 Omo ST. L.J.
1037, 1039-58 (1991) (discussing the difference between formalism and functionalism).
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law, and Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston-therefore
continued to recognize a large number of traditional interpretive rules of
contract interpretation to help ascertain the parties' reasonable
expectation to coverage, including: contract ambiguity and the doctrine
of contra proferentem, contract unconscionability and public policy
issues, and equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel,
promissory estoppel, election, and reformation of contract. A fair
reading of both Williston on Contracts and Corbin on Contracts
therefore suggests that there are far more similarities than differences in
their respective approaches to contract law in general, and insurance
42
coverage disputes in particular.

A majority of American courts have not explicitly adopted, nor
explicitly rejected, a legal formalist or a legal functionalist
jurisprudential posture, although a nwnber of courts have recently
criticized Professor Keeton 's rights at variance with the policy
language or "strong" reasonable expectations approach to insurance
coverage disputes. 43
Instead, most American courts have arguably adopted a "middle
ground" or "consensus" interpretive approach to insurance coverage
disputes and remain unwilling or unable to reject these contractually
based interpretative rules and remedies in order to ascertain the
reasonable expectations of the parties in insurance contract disputes. 44
A realistic consensus approach to the insurance law doctrine of
reasonable expectations therefore recognizes a number of wellestablished contractual parameters for allowing judicial discretion,
when justice and equity requires it, to recognize and honor the
reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage in insurance contract
disputes that are supplemental to-rather than at variance with-the
terms of the parties' insurance contract.45
How this "middle ground" or "consensus" interpretive approach
to insurance contract disputes affects property insurance concurrent
causation issues will be discussed more fully below.46

42. Swisher, supra note 27, at 755 (footnotes omitted).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
44. These contractually based interpretive rules, once again, would include (1) the
doctrine of ambiguities; (2) contract unconscionability and public policy issues; (3) equitable
remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and contract
reformation; and (4) a number of additional interpretive rules applied to standardized
insurance contracts as contracts of adhesion. See Swisher, supra note 27, at 778.
45. Id
46. See discussion inb Parts ill-V.

2014]

D

REASSESSING PROPERTY INSURANCE

Multiple Concurrent Causation: Immediate Cause
Efficient or Dominant Proximate Cause

529

~rsus

A final issue with concurrent causation in a causal chain of
events is determining which concurrent cause (or causes) is the
primary or dominant cause resulting in an insurable loss.
American courts have not been uniform in analyzing the primary
or dominant concurrent causes in a causal chain of events, and most
courts have applied one of two competing interpretive models for
multiple concurrent causation: (1) the immediate cause rule, involving
the cause nearest to the loss, and (2) the efficient or dominant cause
rule, similar to the classic tort substantial factor rule for multiple
47
concurrent causation.
The traditional immediate cause rule is that the cause of loss in an
insurance law context must be the immediate cause of the injury or
loss, rather than a "dominant" proximate concurrent cause in a causal
chain of events.48 For example, in the case of Queen Insurance Co. of
America v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., Justice Holmes
wrote:
[T]he common understanding is that in construing these [insurance]
policies we are not to take broad views but generally are to stop our
inquiries with the cause nearest to the loss. This is a settled rule of
construction, and, if it is understood, does not deserve much criticism,
since theoretically at least the parties can shape their [insurance]
49
contract as they like.

A growing number of American courts, however, have rejected
this immediate cause rule in favor of an efficient or dominant
proximate cause rule. 50 Under this classic tort efficient or dominant
multiple concurrent causation rule, there will be coverage if a risk of
loss that is specifically insured against in the policy sets in motion, in
47. See STEMPEL, supmnote 13, § 7.02.
48. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Aitways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989,
1007-08 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying New York law); Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Co.,
777 S.W.2d 501, 505-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
49. 263 U.S. 487, 492 (1924); see also Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 222 P.2d
833, 834-35 (Wash. 1950) ("In the rare instances where proximate cause has any bearing in
[insurance] contract cases, it has a different meaning than when used in tort.... In tort cases,
the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing culpability, with
which insurance cases are not concerned. . . . Insurance cases are not concerned with why the
injury occurred or the question of culpability, but only with the nature of the injury and how it
happened."). However, this case subsequently was overruled by Graham v. Public Employees
Mutual Insurance Co., which adopted the efficient or dominant multiple concurrent causation
rule. 656 P.2d 1077 (Wash. 1983).
50. Eg., Graham, 656 P.2d 1077.
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an unbroken causal sequence, the events that cause the ultimate loss,
even though the last immediate cause in the causal chain of events may
have been an excluded cause. 51
For example, in the case of Shirone, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
North America, the insured's cattle died during a violent storm that
produced high winds, damp snow, and muddy field conditions. The
insurance policy insured livestock against death by windstorm but did
not provide coverage for any loss caused by "dampness of atmosphere
or extremes of temperature."52 Expert witnesses testified that the cattle
died due to a combination of substantial concurrent causes-wind,
cold temperature, snow, muddy conditions, the lack of adequate wind
protection, and the size and age of the cattle. The jury found that the
windstorm was the dominant or efficient proximate cause of the loss,
notwithstanding the contribution of other excluded factors to the loss,
and this jury verdict in favor of coverage for the policyholder was
affirmed on appeal. 53
Commercial property insurance policies often employ this
concurrent causation principle in this manner:
We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any of
the following [excluded causes]. But if an excluded cause of loss listed
[below] results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the loss or
damage caused by the Covered Cause of Loss.54
Which is the better-reasoned rule? The immediate cause rule?
Or the dominant or efficient proximate cause rule? As I concluded in
an earlier article:
Clearly, the "immediate cause" rule cannot be applied in all
circumstances, especially when it is unfair and contrary to the intent of
51. Id at I 081 ("Where a peril specifically insured against sets other causes in
motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the act and final loss,
produce the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the
'proximate cause' of the entire loss. . . . It is the efficient or predominant cause which sets
into motion the chain of events producing the loss which is regarded as the proximate cause,
no/necessarily the last act in a chain of events." (emphasis added)); TNT Speed & Sport Ctr.,
Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Missouri law); Assur. Co.
of Am. v. Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.J. 1999); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Cent. Mut. Ins.
Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 (D. Or. 1964); Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217 (Miss.
1972); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667 (Vt. 1997); Bowers v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 991 P.2d 734 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Hirschmann, 760 P.2d 969 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
52. Shinrone, Inc. v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 570 F.2d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying
Iowa law).
53. Id at 718-19.
54. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, BP 00 02 01 96, BUSINESS OwNERS SPECIAL PROPERTY
COVERAGE FORM (2008).
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the contracting parties. On the other hand, the "efficient" or
"dominant" proximate cause rule should not be applied to insurance
coverage disputes when the initial cause in the causal chain of events is
too remote. The better reasoned view, therefore, in order to validate the
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties . . . would be to
permit a court to apply either the "immediate cause" rule or the
"efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule according to which rule
would provide coverage in a particular insurance contract dispute,
especially if there was policy language that was arguably ambiguous. 55
Ill. THREE MULTIPLE CONCURRENT CAUSATION RULES IN
PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES

American courts have employed no fewer than three different
interpretive rules addressing property insurance coverage disputes
involving multiple concurrent causation:
(1) a traditional
"conservative rule," (2) a "liberal rule," and (3) a majority efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule.

A.

The Traditional "Conservative Rule"Applied to Property
Insurance ConcU1Tent Causation Coverage Disputes

Under the traditional "conservative rule" applied to property
insurance concurrent causation coverage disputes, if a covered loss
combines with an excluded loss to produce a loss, then the insured
cannot recover under his or her property insurance policy based upon
an underlying public policy rationale that an insurer should not be held
responsible for any loss caused by an excluded peril as a concurrent
cause of the insured's loss. 56
55. Swisher, Causation Issues, supra note 5, at 368 (footnote omitted), cited with
approval in STEMPEL, supra note 13, at 7-14; see also Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (Cigna) Fire
Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206 (Wash. 1994) (reasoning that the efficient proximate
cause rule favors coverage); WINDT, supra note 36, at 623 ("[W]hether a court applied the
immediate cause rule [or the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule] might depend
upon whether one is considering a 'cause' that would exclude coverage or one that would
create coverage. If the policy language is ambiguous, a court should adopt the immediate
cause rule when the rule would serve to render an exclusion inapplicable, even though the
court would apply [the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule] when applying a
policy provision extending coverage.").
56.
See Lydick v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 187 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Neb. 1971) (holding that
under this traditional "conservative rule," if a covered hazard expressly excluded from the
policy to produce a loss, then the insured cannot recover); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 1,
at 541-44 (discussing the conservative view of insurance causation); Swisher, Causation
Issues, supra note 5, at 369 (discussing three approaches to multiple causation disputes). For
illustration of these principles, refer to the following cases: Abady v. Hanover Fire Insurance
Co., 266 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1959) (applying Vrrginia law); Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v.
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Thus, under this traditional "conservative rule":
[I]f a [covered] windstorm combines with a hazard expressly excluded
from the policy coverage [such as high water, flooding, or other water
damage] to produce the loss [then] the insured may not recover. This
[traditional "conservative"] rule appears to be bottomed on the
reasoning that the insurer cannot be held liable for any part of the
damage caused by the excluded hazard, [and] the total loss resulting
from the combined action of the two [covered and excluded perils] falls
outside the policy coverage. 57
The weakness of this traditional "conservative rule;' however, is that
the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage are easily
frustrated and abrogated. 58
During the past two decades, many insurers have revised their
standardized property insurance policy forms in an attempt to make
this traditional "conservative rule" the controlling interpretative
concurrent causation doctrine through various anti-concurrent
causation provisions.59
B.

The "Liberal Rule"Applied to Property Insurance Concurrent
Causation Covera.ge Disputes

Other courts have adopted a more "liberal" rule, holding that
when loss occurs through the concurrence of covered and excluded
risks in a property insurance context, the insurer is liable for the entire
loss, as long as at least one of the covered risks was a proximate cause
of the loss. 60
Muhle, 208 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1953) (applying Missouri law); Northern Assurance Co. of
America v. EDP Floors, Inc., 533 A.2d 682 (Md. 1987); Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Clarke,
475 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1991); Graffv. Fanners' Mutual Home Insurance Co., 317 N.W2d
741 (Neb. 1982).
57. J.C. Vance, Annotation, Causes ofLoss Under Wmdstonn Insurance Coverage,
93 A.L.R.2d 145, 161-62 (1964); see also Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 191 (applying
Missouri law and holding that the plaintiff could not recover under a similar concurrent
causation issue); Wood v. Mich. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 96 S.E.2d 28, 30 (N.C. 1957)
("[I]fthe cause insured against (windstorm) and an excluded cause (high water) combined to
create the damage, plaintiff could not recover."); Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund,
393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover for damage resulting
from wind and tidal wave); Franklin Fire lns. Co. v. Smith, 103 S.W2d 470 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1937) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover under a wind and high water
concurrent causation issue).
58. Seesupratextaccompanying notes 17-39.
59. See supra text accompanying note 6; discussion infra Part IY.
60. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying
California law); Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ohio
1975); Gen Am. Transp. Corp. v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 239 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tenn. 1965);
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973); Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d
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The advantage of this liberal view of causation, at least for the
insured policyholder, is that when various causes combine to produce
an insured loss, a dominant or predominant efficient cause need not be
shown--only a minimally sufficient proximate cause. 61 For example,
in the case of Benke v. Mukwonago- ~mon Mutual Insurance Co.,
when snow on a roof (an excluded peril) combined with wind (a
covered peril) to blow down a stable, the court held that coverage
existed, without discussing which cause was dominant. 62
The major disadvantage of this "liberal rule" however, is that
insurers probably never intended to provide such broad coverage under
their property insurance policies, and not surprisingly, various
commentators in a number of insurance-defense-oriented journals
have strongly attacked this liberal rule. 63

C

The Majon'ty Efficient or Dominant Proximate Cause Rule
Applied to Property Insurance Concurrent Causation Coverage
Disputes

The majority approach to concurrent causation issues in property
insurance coverage disputes, in order to validate the insurer's
contractual rights and obligations, as well as validate the insured 's
reasonable expectation to coverage,64 is to require the finding of a
889 (Cal. 1963); Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Henning
Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1992); Lawver v. Boling, 238 N.W.2d 514
(Wis. 1976).
This "liberal rule" used to be called the "California rule." Subsequently, however, the
California Supreme Court repudiated its "liberal" concurrent causation rule, and California
currently recognizes a dominant or efficient causal nexus rule in property insurance
concurrent causation coverage disputes. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Von Der Lieth,
820 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1991); Benavides v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 650 (Ct.
App. 2006). California has codified its insurance proximate causation doctrine in CAL. INS.
CODE§§ 530, 532 (2013).
61.
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 1, at 539-41.
62.
329 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982); see also Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that when the improper design and
construction of a building (a covered peril) combines with the settling of soil (an excluded
peril) to produce loss, coverage exists regardless of which cause was dominant).
See Houser, supra note 4; Houser & Kent, supra note 4; Litsey, supra note 4;
63.
Wueful & Koop, supra note 4. These commentators generally make a distinction between
first-party property insurance concurrent causation disputes (e.g., Sabella v. Msle.ry, which
arguably should require a dominant or efficient concurrent causal nexus, and third-party
liability insurance concurrent causation disputes (e.g., State Fann Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Partndge), which arguably may only require a minimal or sufficient causal
nexus to compensate the third-party claimant for his or her injuries. See, e.g., Houser &
Kent, supra note 4, at 578-83.
See supm text accompanying notes 17-39.
64.
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covered dominant or efficient proximate cause m any property
insurance concurrent causation coverage dispute. 65
Under this realistic "middle ground" property insurance
concurrent causation approach, if multiple concurrent causes exist, and
if the dontinant or efficient cause of loss is a covered peril, then
coverage would exist for the entire loss, even though other concurrent
causes were not covered under the policy. 66 As explained in the case of

Duensing v. State Fann Fire & Casualty Co.:
The efficient proximate cause doctrine ... applies "in determining
the cause of a loss for the purpose of fixing insurance liability when
concurring causes of the damage appear, the proximate cause is the
dominant or efficient one that sets the other causes in operation;
incidental causes are not proximate though they may be nearer in time
and place to the loss." . . . If the insured successfully demonstrates that
the proximate cause of the loss is covered under the policy, the entire
loss is covered notwithstanding the fact that an event in the chain of
67
causation was specifically excluded from coverage.

If neither cause is dontinant, then loss probably would be attributed to
the cause that would result in coverage.68
The dominant or efficient concurrent causation approach is
justified, not only because it honors the reasonable expectation of the
policyholder to coverage and disallows the insurer an unconscionable
advantage, but also because of the well-established insurance law
rationale of liberally resolving any ambiguities in insurance coverage
disputes in favor of the insured (the nondrafting party), and strictly
construing such ambiguities against the insurer (the drafting party).69
This dominant or efficient concurrent causation approach has not
been without its critics. Richard Fierce, for example, advocates that
any concurrent causation approach, even the "conservative" approach,
65. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59; see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 1, at 534-39 (discussing dominant or efficient proximate cause approach to insurance
causation coverage disputes).
See, e.g., Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1979)
66.
(applying Maryland law); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Von Der Lieth, 820 P.2d 285 (Cal.
1991); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1991); Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins.
Co., 257 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1972); Hahn v. M.F.A. Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); W. Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. ofN.D., 643 N.W.2d 4 (N.D. 2002); King v. N. River
Ins. Co., 297 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1982).
131 P.3d 127, 133 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
67.
68. See Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N. W.2d 917, 921-23 (Minn. 1983); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (App. Div. 1988).
69.
See, e.g., RoBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 553-59 (1988);
William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law Altemative to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in the Construction ofInsurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1175 (1982).
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is better than the ''unpredictable hocus-pocus" of the dominant or
efficient concurrent causation rule. 70 And Erik Knutsen argues:
"Dominance" is often in the eye of the beholder. There is little
consistency among jurisdictions and even among the same courts with
similar fact patterns in cases over time. This has created a tortured
pattern of litigation because litigants cannot reliably predict coverage in
concurrent causation cases where the dominant cause approach will be
11
applied.

However, other commentators argue for retaining this dominant
or efficient causation rule, as recognized in a majority of courts today. 12
Admittedly, the dominant or efficient concurrent causation approach is
not a bright-line rule, and may require judicial interpretation based on
the facts of a particular case. But it still provides a realistic "middle
ground" compromise to the proinsurer "conservative" rule and the
proinsured "liberal" rule.
IV. ANTI-CONCURRENT CAUSATION CLAUSES IN PROPERTY
INSURANCE POLICIES: INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS

Over the past two decades, a number of property insurance
companies have unilaterally revised their standardized homeowners
insurance policies and other property insurance policies in an apparent
effort to make the traditional "conservative" approach to concurrent
causation,73 rather than the "liberal" approach74 or the efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule, 75 binding upon the parties through
express contractual language appearing within the insurance policy
itself. 76
For example, a recommended provision related to homeowners
property insurance, drafted by the Insurance Services Office (ISO),
states in relevant part: "We do not insure for loss caused directly or
indirectly by any of the following. . . . Such loss is excluded regardless
of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any
sequence to the loss."77 And in 2006, the ISO included new language
70. Richard A. Fierce, Insurance Law-Concurrent Causation: Examination of
AltemativeApproaches, 10 S. lLL. U. L.J. 527, 544-45 (1985).
71. Knutsen, supra note 2, at 975-76 (footnotes omitted).
72. See Swisher, Causation Issues, supra note 5, at 370-71; STEMPEL, supra note 13,
§ 7.01-.03.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
76. See Swisher, Causation Requirements, supra note 5, at 27.
77. SPECIAL FORM, supra note 6.
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introducing homeowners insurance policy exclusions that states, "We
do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following ...."78 These homeowners policy provisions are variously
known as "lead-in clauses" or "anti-concurrent causation clauses."
The average homeowner, of course, probably would not be aware
of this anti-concurrent causation change in his or her homeowners
insurance policy, although it is generally held to be the duty of an
insured to read and understand one's own insurance policy. 79
In fonning a contract, an insured relies not upon the text of the policies
but on the general descriptions of the coverage provided by the insurer
and its agents during the time the insured was considering whether to
submit an application. Absent a special request, an insured will not see
the text of the policy until after the application has been submitted and
the first premium paid. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising
that the so-called "duty to read" has less significance in [some] modem
80
cases.

A.

Judicial Recognition ofAnti-ConcUJTent Causation Clauses: An
Interpretive Conundrum and Possible Solutions

Since the recent introduction of such "lead-in" or anti-concurrent
causation clauses within the express policy language of many property
insurance policies, approximately twenty American courts8 ' have
recognized the validity of these anti-concurrent causation clauses,
where the parties are allowed to contract around, or contract out of, any
default dominant or efficient concurrent causation approach (or a
default "liberal" causation approach), in various contemporary
property insurance policies. 82
78. BROAD FORM, supra note 6.
79. See Kanellis v. Pac. lndem. Co., 917 So. 2d 149, 154-55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005);
Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202, 1208 (D.C. 1999); Rory v. Cont'! Ins. Co.,
703 N.W2d 23, 42 (Mich. 2005).
80. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I, at 192 ("Yet the doctrine can still have force,
and it must not be overlooked in contemporary litigation." (citing Dahlke v. John F. Zimmer
Ins. Agency, Inc., 515 N.W2d 767 (Neb. 1994))). The authors conclude, "To summarize,
jurisdictions are [currently] divided on whether the insured has a duty to read the policy, and
this disagreement has enormous implications for how particular cases are decided." Id at
193.
81.
See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 4, at 35-39 (diagramming key cases from each
state allowing anti-concurrent causation clauses).
82.
See Front Row Theatre, Inc. v. Am. Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Cos., 18 F.3d 1343
{6th Cir. 1994) (applying Ohio law); Schroeder v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F. Supp.
558 (D. Nev. 1991 ); Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1989); Cameron v. USAA Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 733 A.2d 965 (D.C. 1999); W Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davies, 601 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct.
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For example, in the case of State Fann Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Bongen, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized State Farm's anticoncurrent lead-in clause relating to an earth movement exclusionary
clause in its property insurance policy and held for the insurer.83 But in
the subsequent case of ~st v. Umialik Insurance Co., the same
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor
of the insurer and held that summary judgment should be entered in
favor of the insured. 84 The court rejected the insurer's argument that its
previous Bongen case was established precedent because the property
insurance policy in Bongen had an anti-concurrent causation lead-in
clause, where the policy in ~st had no such clause, so the court
would apply the efficient or dominant concurrent causation
interpretive approach. 85
Likewise, in the case of Powell v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., the Nevada Supreme Court held that a property insurance policy
at issue in the earlier case of Schroeder v. State Fann Fire & Casualty
Co. 86 was distinguishable from, and inapplicable to, the policy at issue
in the Powell case because Schroeder's policy had an anti-concurrent
causation provision, which excluded earth movement combined with
water, whereas Powell's policy did not have an all-inclusive anticoncurrent causation provision. Thus, the court held that the trial court
erred in its reliance on Schroeder. 81
Not all courts have wholeheartedly embraced anti-concurrent
causation lead-in clauses in property insurance policies. For example,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Murray
v. State Fann Fire & Casualty Co. questioned other jurisdictions'
findings that State Farm's anti-concurrent causation lead-in clause
involving earth movement was valid and unambiguous. Anticoncurrent causation clauses, according to the West Virginia court, are
contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties88 and void against
public policy because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion,
App. 2004) (dicta); Riche v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 356 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1978); Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 N.W2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Kula v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. Div. 1995); Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W2d 515
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1988).
83. 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996).
84. 8 P.3d 1135 (Alaska 2000).
85. Id at 1141.
86. 770 F. Supp. at 561.
87. Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668, 674-75 (Nev. 2011).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 17-39 for a discussion of reasonable
expectations.
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and the parties did not freely contract "to exclude the efficient
proximate cause doctrine."89
Two states have adopted an efficient or dominant concurrent
proximate cause doctrine by state statutory enactment, which would
arguably supersede any anti-concurrent causation provisions found
within the policy language itself.90 For example, the California
Insurance Code provides in relevant part:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the
proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract may
have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of
91
which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.

Likewise, a North Dakota statute states:
An insurer is liable for a loss proximately caused by a peril insured
against even though a peril not contemplated by the insurance contract
may have been a remote cause of the loss. An insurer is not liable for a
loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause. The
efficient proximate cause doctrine applies only if separate, distinct, and
92
totally unrelated causes contribute to the loss.

Thus, in the case of l*stem National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
University of North Dakota, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that because the efficient or dominant concurrent causation doctrine
was codified in state law, the insurer could not contract around it with
an anti-concurrent causation provision in its policy.93
This efficient proximate cause doctrine comporting with state
public policy is not limited only to statutory law. In the case of Safeco
Insurance Co. ofAmenca v. Hirschmann, for example, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine in
Washington would trump any property insurance anti-concurrent
causation policy provisions to the contrary.94
What is especially troubling, however, is the burden of proof that
insurers must meet in validating their anti-concurrent causation clauses
89. Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d l, 15 n.14 (W. Va. 1998).
90.
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE§ 530 (2013).
91.
Id; see also Julian v. Hartford Underwriters lns. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 904 (Cal.
2005) ("We have construed [California Insurance Code] section 530 as incorporating into
California law the efficient proximate cause doctrine, an interpretive rule for first party
insurance.").
92. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 26.1-32-01 (2013).
93. 643 N.W.2d 4, 13 (N.D. 2002).
94.
773 P.2d 413, 416-17 (Wash. 1989) (''When an insured risk sets into operation a
chain of causation in which the last step may be an excluded risk, the exclusion will not
defeat recovery.").
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in property insurance policies. An insured, for example, generally
must prove that a "dzi-ectphysical loss to property" occurred.95 But the
2006 ISO language for anti-concurrent causation lead-in clauses states,
"We do not insure for loss caused dzi-ectly or indzi-ectly by any of the
following ...."96 Granted, many property insurance policies provide
all-risk coverage, except for enumerated exclusions,97 and the burden
of persuasion is thus on the insurer to prove such exclusions.98
But can an insurer also argue an indirect causal nexus to prove its
exclusions--even assuming that such exclusions to coverage may not
have been efficient or dominant causal factors in the concurrent causal
chain of events? Assume, for example, that combined water damage
and earth movement are excluded under an insurer's anti-concurrent
causation lead-in clause, but such earth movement, in fact, was indirect
and insignificant (and maybe the water damage was indirect and
insignificant as well). Can the insurer still deny coverage? Common
sense (not to mention law, equity, and the reasonable expectations of
the parties) would suggest the answer should be ''No."99 But few, if
any, anti-concurrent causation clauses expressly require that a
dominant or efficient exclusionary cause must be proved by the
insurer, as it must normally be proved by the insured for coverage to
apply. 100 And here, as Douglas Widin suggests, "The danger with the
anticoncurrent causation clause is that it could in theory tempt an
insurer to take it to an unreasonable extreme, which in tum could cause
a court to overreact and construe the clause too narrowly, creating an
undesirable precedent." 101
To avoid this possible interpretive conundrum, I would
recommend a "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" rule:
That is, in any property insurance coverage dispute involving anticoncurrent causation lead-in clauses, in order to deny coverage
effectively, the insurer must also demonstrate that its excluded cause or
causes that were clearly enumerated in its property insurance policy
must also have been dominant or efficient concurrent causes in the
95.
See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowner's 3-Special Form HO 00 03 JO
00, MIAMI UNIY. ( 1999), http://www.sba.muohio.edu/adelmasw/classes/Policies/O 1-08%20
H03_sample.pdf(emphasis added).
96.
BROAD FORM, supra note 6.
97. Such exclusions may include earth movement, water damage, neglect, war,
nuclear hazard, and intentional loss. Ins. Servs. Office Inc., supra note 95, at 11-12.
See JEFFREY w STEMPEL, PETER N. SWISHER & ERIK S. KNuTSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
98.
INSURANCE LAW 657-61 (4th ed. 2011).
See supra text accompanying notes 17-39.
99.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 17-39.
101. See Knox, supra note 3.
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causal chain of events-similar to the insured's burden of proof in
property insurance coverage disputes involving multiple concurrent
causation. 102 Moreover, if some courts have been impliedly utilizing
this informal "goose/gander" interpretive rule, they should now
expressly adopt it as a reasonable "middle ground" judicial
precedent. 103

R

ApplyingAnti-Concurrent Causation Clauses to Hunicane
Katrina Property Insurance Coverage Disputes: Some Dlustrative
Cases as a Template for Hu.mcane Sandy Coverage Disputes

The following wind-versus-water concurrent causation opinions
illustrate troubling and inconsistent judicial interpretations of anticoncurrent causation clauses in Hurricane Katrina-related litigation. In
the majority of these cases, federal district court judges in Mississippi
and Louisiana interpreted anti-concurrent causation clauses in various
property insurance policies to provide coverage to the policyholders. 104
But the Fifth Circuit, applying a more formalistic plain meaning
textual approach to anti-concurrent causation clauses, subsequently
held that there was no coverage provided to the policyholders under
these clauses. 105
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and the
GulfCoast. 106 On Sunday, August 28, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin
ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city, but when Katrina made
landfall in Louisiana, an estimated 100,000 people were still in New
Orleans. 101 At the time, Katrina was the strongest hurricane ever
recorded in the Gulf of Mexico, leaving 1800 people dead in its wake,
and in terms of property damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, it still ranks as the costliest storm in the history of the United
States. 108

102. See supra text accompanying notes 4 7-55.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
104. See, e.g., Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHw,
2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 17, 2007).
105. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2008).
106. G.M. Filisko, Miat Did Katrina Teach Us?, 97 AB.A. J. 33, 33 (2011).
107. Id
108. See id Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged the East Coast of the United States
during the last week of October 2012, was responsible for damages estimated to be in the
range of $50 to $60 billion. Hurricane Katrina's damages, by comparison, amounted to
approximately 157 billion dollars. NBC Nighdy News (NBC television broadcast Nov. 27,
2012), avaJlable at https://archive.org/details/KNTV_20121128_0 l 3000_NBC_Nightly_
News.
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many Gulf Coast residents
whose homes were damaged or destroyed turned to their property
insurance companies to provide compensation for their losses, only to
find that their homeowners' policy explicitly excluded losses due to
flooding. 109 Such policies would often cover damages caused by wind
or rain, but excluded damages caused from water. For many homes
affected by Hurricane Katrina, the damage was caused by a concurrent
combination of wind and water, where one dominant factor in the
causal chain of events was covered, but the other causal factor was
excluded from coverage. 110 And often, with this wind-versus-water
debate, numerous homeowners policies also contained anti-concurrent
causation lead-in clauses. 111 The following cases illustrate this windversus-water interpretive conundrum affecting Hurricane Katrina
property insurance coverage disputes with anti-concurrent lead-in
clauses:
1.

Buente v. Allstate Insurance Co.

In Buente v. Allstate Insurance Co., the plaintiff insureds brought
an action against the Allstate Insurance Company and its agents as a
result of a denial of coverage for hurricane damages resulting from
112
The
Hurricane Katrina under the insureds' homeowners policy.
insurers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
insureds did not have a cause of action, especially under Allstate's anticoncurrent lead-in clause incorporated into the homeowners policy.
The major dispute in this case was whether the Buentes' losses
109. Many Mississippi homeowners, for example, did not purchase flood insurance,
either because their mortgage companies did not require it or because their properties were
not in a designated flood plain. Additional flood insurance may be purchased through the
federal government under the National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 400 I (2006). See
STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNuTSEN, supra note 98, § 3.03(B)(3).
110. See, e.g.; Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
111. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and Catastrophe in the Case of
KJJtrina and Beyond, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 49, 73 (2006) (defending the insurers' "combined
causes" exclusions due to the potential ''to seriously impair insurance markets in affected
states"); Brendan R. Vaughan, Note, U4ltered Down: Are Insurance Companies Getting
Hosed in the Wmd vs. ™1ter Controversy?, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 777, 777 (2008) (arguing for
a "conservative approach" to these wind versus water concurrent causation disputes;
otherwise, the "insurance companies will be forced to either raise premiums or to discontinue
offering insurance in the Gulf Coast region"). But see Amber L. Altemose, Comment, The
Anti-Concurrent Clause and Its Impact on Texas Residents After Hurricane Ike, 16 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 201, 223 (2010) ("By invalidating the anti-concurrent clause and requiring
insurance companies to pay for damages that are covered under the insurance policy, Texas
will send a message to insurance companies to fix the broken system.").
112. 422 F. Supp. 2d 690.
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attributable to this storm surge were covered losses because they were
wind-driven; or whether these losses were excluded from coverage
because they were caused by water or flood.
The Allstate homeowners policy provided in relevant part with
regard to the insured dwelling (section I, coverage A) and other
structures (section I, coverage B):
Losses We Cover ... We will cover sudden and accidental direct
physical loss to [the insured property] ... except as limited or excluded
in this policy. . . . Losses We Do Not Cover ... We do not cover loss to
the [insured] property consisting of or caused by: 1. Flood, including,
but not limited to surface water, waves, tidal water, or overflow of any
body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by
wind. 113
114

Windstorm losses, however, were covered under the policy.
The
policy also contained anti-concurrent lead-in clauses for both real
property and personal property that stated in relevant part, "We do not
cover loss to covered property ... when: a) there are two or more
causes of loss to the covered property; and b) the predominant cause(s)
115
of loss is (are) excluded under [l]osses."
The major dispute in this case, according to Judge Senter of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
was
whether losses attributable to "storm surge" are . . . wind driven or
whether losses attributable to "storm surge" are excluded from coverage
because such damages are caused by ''water'' (Exclusion 4) or by
"flood, including but not limited to surface water, waves, tidal water or
overflow of any body of water, or spray from any of these whether or
116
not driven by wind" (Exclusion 1).
Judge Senter emphasized that the exclusions found in the policy
for water damage and damages attributable to flooding "are valid and
enforceable policy provisions."m But he also stressed that because this
113. Id at 693.
114. Id at 694.
115. Id
116. Id at 696.
117. Id Indeed, in the subsequent case of Buente v. Allstate Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., No. 1:05CV712 LTS JMR, 2006 WL 980784 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 12, 2006),
Judge Senter reiterated that the "flood exclusions" in the policy were not ambiguous.
Hurricane Katrina moved tidal waters from the Mississippi Sound on shore and
inundated thousands of homes, some within and some beyond the ordinary flood
[plain] established by responsible agencies of the United States government. Since
the water that entered and damaged the plaintiffs' home was tidal water, I find that
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was "an exclusion from coverage in a comprehensive homeowners
insurance policy, and because the exclusion constitutes an affirmative
defense, Allstate would bear the burden of proving that the exclusion
applies to the plaintiffs' claims." 118 Moreover, because the policy
carried a specific "Hurricane Deductible Endorsement," "it [was]
apparent to [him] that it was intended to cover damages sustained in a
hurricane because of the effects of rain, hurricane winds, and objects
that might be carried by those winds, whether or not there was also
damage caused by high water." 119
Judge Senter therefore held that the Allstate homeowners policy
was ambiguous, including Allstate's anti-concurrent causation lead-in
clauses that "are ambiguous in light of the other policy provisions
granting coverage for wind and rain damage and in light of the
inclusion of a 'hurricane deductible' as part of the policy." 120
To the extent that plaintiffs can prove their allegations that the hurricane
winds (or objects driven by those winds) and rains entering the insured
premises through openings caused by the hurricane winds proximately
caused damages to the insured property, those losses will be covered
under the policy, and this will be the case even if flood damage, which
121
is not covered, subsequently occurred.

2.

Broussard v. State Fann Fire & Casualty Co.

In Broussard v. State Fann Fire & Casualty Co., the insureds'
Biloxi, Mississippi, home was completely destroyed by Hurricane
Katrina, leaving only the foundation concrete slab. 122 The Broussards,
who did not have flood insurance, brought a claim under their State
Farm homeowners policy, arguing that their home was destroyed by
"tornadic" winds before the Hurricane Katrina storm surge arrived and
that they were therefore entitled to recover under their homeowners
policy for any losses that State Farm could not show were caused by
water. The State Farm claims adjuster who inspected the site, however,
the damage caused by this inundation is excluded from coverage under the Allstate
policy.
Id at *l.
118. Buente, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
119. Id
120. Id at 697.
121. Id Judge Senter also held that alleged representations made by Allstate's agent
that the insureds did not need flood insurance because their property was situated outside the
flood plain was a question of fact to be determined in a subsequent trial. Id at 697-98.
122. No. 1:06CV6 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 113942 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 17, 2007), revli by
Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Mississippi
law).

544

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:515

concluded that the evidence suggested that the home was more
damaged by the flood than by the wind, and State Farm denied the
Broussards' claim in its entirety, applying the State Farm policy's anticoncurrent causation provisions. 123
Judge Senter, once again the federal district court judge in the
Broussard case, noted that because this case dealt with a total loss of
the property---down to the foundation slab--under these
circumstances, the allocation of proof was critical, because "one party
or the other must bear this total loss in the absence of evidence by
which the two types of losses [wind versus water] may be reasonably
identified and separated." 124 The key issue, therefore, would be how
much damage had occurred as a result of the wind before the storm
surge arrived, because the preceding wind damage would be covered,
but any additional damage caused by the arrival of the flood would be
125
excluded. Once the plaintiffs established their prima facie case for
coverage, based on the stipulated pretrial order, then the burden of
proof shifted to State Farm to prove the merits of its affirmative
defense based upon the water damage exclusion in the policy. 126
And here, Judge Senter found as a matter of law that State Farm
had not met its burden of proof as to the segregation of the total loss
into wind damage, which was covered, and water damage, which was
excluded from coverage. Also, State Farm failed to establish or offer
evidence that would support a finding that the insured property
sustained no wind damage. 121 Thus Judge Senter found that State Farm
was liable to the plaintiffs for the full limits of coverage under the
policy and also awarded punitive damages. 128
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Senter's trial court
First, the Fifth Circuit distinguished
decision in Broussard 129
Broussard from an earlier case of Tucpker v. State Fann Fire &

Casualty Co. 130
The claims in Broussard are different from the claims in Tuepker.
The Tuepkerplaintiffs [unsuccessfully] challenged the enforceability of
123. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 622-23.
124. Broussard, 2007 WL 113942, at •2.
125. Id (emphasis added).
126. Id at •3 (citing Lunday v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 696 (Miss. 1973)).
127. Id
128. Id
129. Broussard v. State Fann Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying
Mississippi law).
130. 507 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007) (interpreting a State Farm homeowners insurance
policy with provisions identical to the Broussards' policy in all significant respects).
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the [anti-concurrent causation] clause and the applicability of the water
damage exclusion to a hurricane-created storm surge. The main thrust
of the Broussards' claim is that their home was destroyed by tornadic
131
winds prior to the arrival of the storm surge.
Next, the Fifth Circuit held that the Broussards had named-peril
coverage for their personal property, and open-peril coverage for their
dwelling, meaning that the parties would bear different burdens of
proof under their personal property and dwelling coverage:
For [personal property] ''named peril" coverage ... the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that any losses were caused by a peril covered by the
policy. Under [dwelling] "open peril" coverage ... the plaintiff still has
the basic burden of proving his right to recover. However, under "open
peril" coverage the insurer bears the burden of proving that a particular
peril falls within a policy exclusion, and must plead and prove the
applicability of an exclusion as an affirmative defense. 132
The Broussards' policy also contained an anti-concurrent
causation clause that applied to both the personal property and the
dwelling coverage in the State Farm policy. "The ACC clause, like the
water damage exclusion, is an affirmative defense, and State Farm
bears the burden of pleading and proving that the ACC clause
applies." 133 But State Farm's position on appeal was that it did not rely
on the anti-concurrent causation clause in denying the Broussards'
claim, and that the claim was denied because "absent physical
evidence of wind damage there was no way to pay the claim other than
to speculate." 134 Thus, State Farm had waived any defense based on the
anti-concurrent causation clause. 135
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that State Farm had an arguable
basis for denying the Broussards' claim because the State Farm claims
adjuster and other State Farm expert witnesses testified that the
Broussards' damages came from the storm surge rather than from the
wind, and this testimony was "more than sufficient" to withstand a
136
motion for judgment as a matter of law from the trial court judge. So
although State Farm might be liable for the loss of some roof shingles
131. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 623 n.1 (citations omitted).
132. Id at 625-26 (citing Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 356-57).
133. Id at 626 n.2 (citing Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 365-67).
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id at 625. State Farm's expert witnesses testified that although the wind may
have caused a relatively small amount of damage to the Broussards' roof, Hurricane Katrina's
winds were not strong enough to cause structural damage to the home, which was caused by
the storm surge. Id
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that were damaged by the wind prior to the arrival of the storm surge,
there was no malice or gross negligence on the part of State Farm to
merit any punitive damages in this particular case. 137

3.

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation involved a
group of consolidated cases in New Orleans, Louisiana, where the
plaintiff insureds sought coverage under the defendant insurers'
property insurance policies for damages caused by flooding due to a
number of levee breaches following Hurricane Katrina. 138 The insurers
argued that the massive water damages from the levee breaches during
Hurricane Katrina were excluded from coverage under their policies'
flood exclusions. 139
Defendants contended that all water damage caused by the canal
and levee breaches was excluded from coverage because these policies
excluded coverage for water damage resulting from a "flood" and that
the definition of "flood" was not limited to natural events. 140 Plaintiffs,
however, maintained that the "efficient moving cause" of their loss was
a covered risk, based on third party negligence, leading to the failure of
the levees. 141 Thus, the salient question for district court Judge Duval
[was] whether, in the context of an all-risk policy where coverage is
provided for direct loss to property, these insurance provisions which
exclude coverage for water damage caused by "flood" clearly and
unambiguously exclude from coverage damages caused by ... alleged
third party negligence ... which plaintiffs contend caused a section of
the floodwall ... to break causing water to enter the streets of the City
142
of New Orleans and homes of the plaintiffs in this suit.
137. Id at 627-29.
138. 466 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. La. 2006), vacated, In re Katrina Breaches Litig., 495
F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Louisiana law).
139. Policies issued by defendants Standard Fire, Hartford, Hanover, and Unitrin
insurance companies stated in relevant part: "We do not insure for loss caused directly or
indirectly by any of the following: . . . ( c) Water Damage, meaning: Flood, surface water,
waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or not
driven by wind ...." Id at 740-41 (emphasis omitted). Other defendant insurers had similar
flood exclusions in their property insurance policies. Id at 741-43.
140. Id at 743. The defendants relied on the case of Kane v. Royal Insurance Co. of
AmenCa, 768 P.2d 678, 681(Colo.1989), where the plaintiffs' property had been damaged by
a flood caused by a dam failure, as authority for this proposition. In re Katrina Breaches
Consol Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
141. In re Katrina Breaches Consol Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 744-46. Plaintiffs cited
as authority Riche v. State Fann Fire & Casualty Co., 356 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1978),
for this proposition. 466 F. Supp. at 746.
142. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
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Judge Duval ultimately adopted the position that the term "flood"
is limited only to naturally occurring events, citing to a number of
143
cases in other jurisdictions as authority, and he then went on to
distinguish cases where "flood" included water damage caused by
negligent or intentional acts from the present case. 144 Judge Duval
concluded that the word "flood" has various meanings, and therefore
under Louisiana law "the Court is constrained to find the language
ambiguous" and "[i]f there is any doubt or ambiguity as to the
meaning of a provision in an insurance policy, it must be construed in
favor of the insured and against the insurer." 145 Judge Duval also
stressed that under Louisiana law, the insurance policy should be
construed "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the
light of the customs and usages of the industry. . . . In insurance
parlance, this is labeled the reasonable expectations doctrine." 146
However, a year later, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded
Judge Duval's opinion in Jn re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation. 141
Judge King, writing for the court, concluded that even if the plaintiffs
could prove that the levees were negligently designed, constructed, or
maintained, and that the breaches were due to this negligence,
the flood exclusions in the plaintiffs' [property insurance] policies
unambiguously preclude their recovery. Regardless of what caused the
failure of the flood-control structures that were put in place to prevent
such a catastrophe, their failure resulted in a widespread flood that
damaged the plaintiffs' property. This event was excluded from
coverage under the plaintiffs' insurance policies, and under Louisiana
law, we are bound to enforce the unambiguous terms of their insurance
contracts as written. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not
148
entitled to recover under their policies.

143. Id at 748-50 (citing Ebbing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1 S.W.3d 459 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1999) (burst water pipe)); see Mellon v. Hingham Mut. Fire lns. Co., 472 N.E.2d
674 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (broken drainage pipe in basement); Murray v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 9 n.5 (W Va. 1998) ("A provision in an insurance policy may be
deemed to be ambiguous if courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted the provision in
different ways. This rule is based on the understanding that 'one cannot expect a mere
layman to understand the meaning of a clause respecting the meaning of which fine judicial
minds are at variance."').
144. In re Katrina Breaches Consol Litig., 446 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
145. Id at 756.
146. Id (quoting La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759,
764 (La. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)); see supra text
accompanying notes 17-39 (discussing Professor Keeton's reasonable expectation doctrine).
147. 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Louisiana law).
148. Id at 196.
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Specifically, Judge King cited numerous sources to demonstrate
that the term "flood" was not ambiguous, including various dictionary
and encyclopedia definitions of the term "flood" 149 and Appleman on
Insurance Law. 150 A second insurance law treatise, Couch on
Insurance, also concurred that the term "flood" is generally
unambiguous, and not limited only to natural causes. 151 Judge King
wrote:
In sum, we conclude that the flood exclusions in the plaintiffs'
policies are unambiguous in the context of the facts of this case....
This event was a "flood" within that tenn's generally prevailing
meaning as used in common parlance, and our interpretation of the
exclusions ends there. The flood is unambiguously excluded from
coverage under the plaintiffs' all-risk policies, and the district court's
conclusion to the contrary was erroneous. 152
Accordingly,
we need not address the applicability of anti-concurrent-causation
clauses or the efficient-proximate-cause rule because, as pleaded, there
was not more than one separate cause of the plaintiffs' losses. As the
district court recognized, there are other cases arising in the context of
Hurricane Katrina where these issues may come into play, but this is not
the case for their resolution. 153
4.

Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.

A fourth significant Hurricane Katrina property insurance
dispute was that of Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 154
Plaintiffs Paul and Julie Leonard owned a home in Pascagoula,
Mississippi, that was insured under a Nationwide Insurance Company
homeowners policy. The Leonards' residence was not covered by any
separate policy of flood insurance when it was extensively damaged by
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005. The Leonards' Nationwide
149. Id at 209-14.
150. 5 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH
FORMS§ 3145 (Supp. 2012) (stating that a "flood" contemplated by an insurance exclusion
can result from either natural or artificial causes) (citing Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768
P.2d 678, 681 (Colo. 1989)); see also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, W1Jat Is ''Flood"
Within Exclusionary Clause ofProperty Damage lblicy, 78 A.L.R.4th 817 (1990 & Supp.
2012) (citing Kane, 768 P.2d 678, as authority).
151. PLITT ET AL., supmnote 40, § 153:49.
152. In re Katrina Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 221. This Fifth Circuit opinion arguably
presents more of a formalist than a functionalist conclusion. See supm text accompanying
notes 40-45.
153. In re Katrina Breaches, 495 F.3d at 223.
154. 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006), afftl, 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007).
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insurance policy contained the following anti-concurrent causation
language:
We do not cover loss to any property resulting directly or indirectly
from any of the following. Such a loss is excluded even if another peril
or event contributed concurrently or in any sequence to cause the
loss. . . . (b) Water or damage caused by water-borne material....
Water and water-borne material damage means: (1) flood, surface
water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water, spray from
155
these, whether or not driven by wind.

The policy, however, did cover wind damage. 156 The primary disputes
in this particular case were the cause of the damage, the extent of
damage, and the question of whether Nationwide was legally obligated
to reimburse the Leonards for any or all of this damage. 157 Judge
Senter held:
Under applicable Mississippi law, in a situation such as this, where the
insured property sustains damage from both wind (a covered loss) and
water (an excluded loss) the insured may recover that portion of the loss
which he can prove to have been caused by wind. . . . Nationwide is not
responsible for that portion of the damage it can prove was caused by
water. To the extent property is damaged by wind, and is thereafter also
damaged by water, the insured can recover that portion of the loss
which he can prove to have been caused by wind, but the insurer is not
responsible for any additional loss it can prove to have been later caused
158
by water.

Then Judge Senter summarily invalidated Nationwide's anticoncurrent causation clause, stating, "The provisions of the
Nationwide policy that purport to exclude coverage entirely for
damages caused by a combination of the effects of water (an excluded
loss) and damage caused by the effects of wind (a covered loss) are
ambiguous." 159
Accordingly, Judge Senter found that "[a]lrnost all of the damage
to the Leonard residence is attributable to the incursion of water" and

155. ldat695.
156. Id at 693 ("[T]his damage does not exclude coverage for different damage, the
damage caused by wind, a covered peril, even if the wind damage occurred concurrently or in
sequence with the excluded water damage. The wind damage is covered. The water damage
is not.").
157. Id at 687.
158. Id at 695 (citing Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boatner, 254 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1971))
(citation omitted).
159. ldat693.

550

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:515

awarded damages to the Leonards of $1,661.17 although their total
damages from Hurricane Katrina exceeded $130,000. 160
The Leonards also sued their local Nationwide agent, Jay
Fletcher, whom Paul Leonard had previously asked whether he should
purchase a separate flood insurance policy, and who had ventured his
161
opinion that the purchase of such a policy was not necessary.
But
Judge Senter held that Fletcher did not materially misrepresent the
terms of the Nationwide homeowners policy to the Leonards, nor did
he make any statements that could be reasonably understood to alter
162
the terms of the Nationwide policy.
The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion written by then-Chief Judge
Jones, subsequently affirmed Judge Senter's lower court judgment.
However, the Fifth Circuit also held that Nationwide's anti-concurrent
causation clause was not ambiguous, contrary to what Judge Senter
163
had previously decided.
The first hurdle that attorneys for Nationwide had to overcome
was whether Nationwide had any standing to appeal, based upon the
anti-concurrent causation clause ambiguity issue because "[o]rdinarily,
only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may
exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom." 164 The Fifth Circuit
held, however, that "a party may be aggrieved by a district court
decision that adversely affects its legal rights or position vis-a-vis other
parties in the case or other potential litigants." 165 And, in this particular
case,
[t]he ACC clause and negligent misrepresentation issues are currently
being litigated by Nationwide in hundreds of cases in the trial courts,
causing Nationwide to incur considerable litigation expense and
potential enormous liability to other policyholders. The threat of
additional claims for bad-faith denial of coverage based on the court's
rulings in this case also looms large for Nationwide. In sum, the district
160. Id at 695.
161. Id at 690 ("Fletcher did not carry flood insurance on his own property, and his
office assistant, Cindy Byrd Collins, did not carry flood insurance on her property.").
162. Id at 692 ("The statement embodied Fletcher's opinion, but it did not contain a
reason for that opinion. In my view, Fletcher's statement was not a representation of existing
fact, and it was not, in these particular circumstances, a misrepresentation of fact. ...
[Leonard] did not ask Fletcher to clarify or otherwise explain the effect of the water damage
exclusion in the Nationwide policy.").
163. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying
Mississippi law).
164. Id at 427 (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
165. Id at 428 (quoting Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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court's resolution of both the ACC clause and negligent misrepresentation issues renders Nationwide sufficiently aggrieved by the judgment
below that it retains a stake in appealing the district court's damages
methodology, as well as the collateral issue of the validity of
Nationwide's homeowner's policy in the presence of allegedly
contradictory oral representations by its agents. 166
Next, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Judge Senter and held that
the anti-concurrent causation clause in the Nationwide policy was not
ambiguous.
The Court held that Nationwide's anti-concurrent
causation clause
unambiguously excludes coverage for water damage "even if another
peril"--e.g., wind-"contributed concurrently or in any sequence to
cause the loss." The plain language of the policy leaves the district
court no interpretive leeway to conclude that recovery can be obtained
for wind damage that "occurred concurrently or in sequence with the
excluded water damage." . . . Nationwide's assertion that the district
court "simply read the clause out of the contract," is not all that wide of
167
the mark. The clause is not ambiguous.
Thus concluded Judge Jones,
[b]ecause [Nationwide's] ACC clause is unambiguous, the Leonards
can prevail only if they can demonstrate that [Nationwide's ACC] clause
is prohibited by Mississippi caselaw, statutory law, or public policy.
None of these sources of state law restricts Nationwide's use of the
ACC clause to preclude recovery for concurrently caused hurricane
168
losses.
The Fifth Circuit, in other words, held that parties to a property
insurance contract may validly contract out of, or contract around, a
169
default efficient or dominant proximate cause rule in concurrent
causation coverage disputes, even though the average homeowner
would not be aware of, nor fully understand, the legal effect of such an
110
anti-concurrent causation clause.
The Fifth Circuit applied a more textual and formalistic plain
meaning interpretive approach to anti-concurrent causation clauses in
property insurance policies in these cases, often overruling Mississippi
and Louisiana federal district court opinions that arguably had applied
a more contextual and functionalistic reasonable expectations
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id (citations omitted).
/dat430.
/dat431.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
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interpretive approach to anti-concurrent causation clauses in property
111
insurance policies.
It is not clear at this writing whether the United States Courts of
Appeals for the First and Second Circuits, applying New York and
New Jersey insurance law concepts to a large number of probable
property insurance coverage disputes in the wake of Hurricane Sandy's
devastation of the East Coast in late October of 2012, will likewise
apply a more textual and formalistic plain meaning interpretive
approach to anti-concurrent causation clauses as the Fifth Circuit did,
or whether the Second Circuit will apply a more functionalistic
reasonable expectations interpretive approach to these anti-concurrent
causation clauses in property insurance policies. Arguably, the First
Circuit could recognize a more functionalistic reasonable expectations
interpretive approach, at least applying New Jersey insurance law. 112
V.

SIX POLICYHOLDER DEFENSES TO ANTI-CONCURRENT
CAUSATION CLAUSES IN PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICIES

As the Fifth Circuit noted in the case of Leonard, of those states
that have considered the matter of concurrent causation, approximately
twenty states 113 have enforced the plain meaning of anti-concurrent
causation exclusionary clauses in property insurance policies, which
allows the parties to contract out of, or contract around, the efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule in concurrent causation property
114
insurance coverage disputes.
These state court decisions upholding exclusionary anticoncurrent causation clause language in property insurance policies
therefore apply a more formalistic plain meaning textual approach to
insurance contracts generally rather than applying a more
functionalistic reasonable expectations of the parties contextual
115
approach.
But it is also important to note that appellate courts in
approximately thirty other states have not yet dealt with this troubling

171. See Leonard, 499 F.3d at 4 3 I .
172. New Jersey insurance Jaw, for example, appears to be more supportive of a
reasonable expectations approach to insurance Jaw coverage disputes than do many other
states. See Hardy ex rel Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 965 A.2d 1165 (N.J. 2009); Zacarias v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 1262 (N.J. 200 I). But see Kula v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 628
N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. Div. 1995) (recognizing the validity of anti-concurrent causation clauses
under New York law involving an earth movement exclusion).
I 73. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
174. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 433-34.
175. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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unilateral and exclusionary anti-concurrent causation clause
interpretive conundrum on an appellate court level.
So what should a policyholder do when confronted with
exclusionary anti-concurrent causation language in his or her
homeowners' policy? There are six possible defenses that a
policyholder may raise-and should raise-to counteract the
exclusionary language of an ACC clause in a property insurance
policy.
(1)

Unambiguous anti-concurrent causation language must appear
within the insurance policy itself Otherwise, a default efficient
or dominant proximate cause interpretive rule should be applied

In order to contract out of, or contract around, a default efficient
or dominant proximate cause concurrent causation interpretive
approach, express and unambiguous anti-concurrent causation
language must appear within the insurance policy itself. 116 Otherwise,
a default efficient or dominant proximate cause interpretive rule
should prevail. For example, in Bongen, the Alaska Supreme Court
recognized State Farm's anti-concurrent causation clause relating to an
111
earth movement exclusion in its property insurance policy. But in
the subsequent case of l*s~ the same court applied the efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule for concurrent causation, because that
property insurance policy did not have any anti-concurrent causation
language appearing within the policy itself. 118 Moreover, if a court
finds that the anti-concurrent causation clause language is ambiguous,
then it is to be interpreted liberally in favor of the nondrafting party
(the policyholder) and interpreted strictly against the drafting party
(the insurance company). 119
(2) Even if the anti-concurrent causation language is clear and
unambiguous, the insurer may be held to have waived i~ or be
estopped to deny it
"Waiver" in insurance law is the express or implied voluntary
relinquishment of a known right, which may result from either the
affirmative acts of the insurer or its authorized agent or from the

176. Seesupmnotes 81-87 and accompanying text.
177. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d I 042 (Alaska 1996).
178. West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135 (Alaska 2000); see Powell v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668 (Nev. 2011); supmnotes 86-91 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696 (S.D. Miss. 2006);
see also supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text (analyzing the Buente opinion).
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insurer's nonaction, with knowledge of the applicable facts. 1s° For
example, in Broussard, State Farm's position on appeal was that it did
not rely on its anti-concurrent causation clause in denying the
plaintiffs' claim; so State Farm therefore waived any defense it had
based on its anti-concurrent causation clause. 1s1
"Estoppel," on the other hand, does not require any actual
surrender of a known right. Rather, it implies some misleading act,
conduct, or inaction on the part of the insurer or its agent upon which
the insured detrimentally relies. 1s2 For example, in Leonard, the
plaintiffs sued their local Nationwide agent, Jay Fletcher, who had
ventured his opinion that the Leonards did not need to buy a separate
flood insurance policy, and the Leonards argued that they had relied on
Fletcher's statement to their detriment. 1s3 But the trial court judge ruled
on the facts of this particular case that Fletcher did not materially
misrepresent the terms of the Nationwide policy, nor did he make any
statements which could be reasonably understood to alter the terms of
the Nationwide policy. 184 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit likewise held
that Fletcher's statements did not bind Nationwide:
General agency law controls the relationship between insurance
companies and their agents. Under Mississippi law, an agent's
representations that purport to modify the insurance contract can bind
an [insurance company] only if the statements were made pursuant to
actual or apparent authority. . . . Nationwide does not authorize its
[general] agents to orally modify contracts . . . [; therefore,] the
Leonard's reliance on Fletcher's statements was objectively
unreasonable in light of the policy language clearly excluding water
damage, including damage caused by a flood. 1ss
However, in those cases where a general agent's powers are not so
limited by the insurer, a waiver or estoppel argument based upon the
actual or apparent authority of the agent may be actionable. 1s6
180. Purr ET AL., supra note 40; JEFFREY w STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
DISPUTES§ 5.01-.05 (3d rev. ed. 2010); STEMPEL, SWISHER& KNuTSEN, supra note 98.
181. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 625 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)
(applying Mississippi law).
182. STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNuTSEN, supra note 98, at 491-92; see also First Am. Title
Ins. Co. v. Firriolo, 695 S.E.2d 918, 925 (W. Va. 20 I 0) (describing the general rules of the
estoppel doctrine).
183. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006),
aff(f, 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that an actor must have falsely represented or
concealed a material fact for estoppel to apply).
184. Id at 692.
185. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 439-40 (citation omitted).
186. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I, at 212-50.
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Some courts, applying a fimctionalistic reasonable expectations
interpretive approach, rather than a fonnalistic plain meaning
contractual approach, may declare that anti-concurrent causation
clauses found in property insurance policies are invalid and
unconscionable based on public policy grounds.

The West Virginia Supreme Court in Murray rejected the
reasoning that parties to a property insurance contract can contract out
of or contract around an efficient or dominant proximate cause
181
doctrine. Anti-concurrent causation clauses, according to the West
Virginia Supreme Court, are contrary to the reasonable expectations of
188
the parties and void as against public policy because insurance
contracts normally are contracts of adhesion, and the parties did not
freely contract "to exclude the efficient proximate cause doctrine." 189
Although this West Virginia reasonable expectations approach to the
interpretation of anti-concurrent causation clauses in property
insurance policies is not currently a majority approach today, it may be
persuasive to other functionalist American courts that have not yet had
an opportunity to interpret anti-concurrent causation clauses in their
own particular jurisdictions.
(4) If a state has enacted a statute recognizing that the efficient or
dominant proximate cause doctrine is applicable to insurance
concurrent causation issues, the statute will prevm1 over any anticoncurrent causation clause language appearing in the policy.
Califomia190 and North Dakota191 each require efficient proximate
causation by state statute, and such statutory language would prevail
over any anti-concurrent causation clause language in the property
insurance policy itself. 192
(5) Even in the absence of a state statute mandating an efficient or
dominant proximate cause approach to concurrent causation
disputes, a state court could stJ11 apply an efficient proximate
cause doctrine if the anti-concurrent clause language excluded
187. Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998) (involving an
anti-concurrent causation clause involving earth movement); see supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
189. Murray, 509 S.E.2d at 15 n.14.
190. See CAL. INS. CODE§ 530 (2013).
191. SeeN.D.CENT.CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2013).
192. See, e.g., Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005); W.
Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. ofN.D., 643 N.W.2d 4 (N.D. 2002).
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certain perils, no matter how insignificant those penls may have
been to the loss.
Persuasive arguments supporting the efficient proximate cause
doctrine over anti-concurrent causation clause policy language in
property insurance coverage disputes are not limited only to statutory
law. For example, in Hirschmann, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine in Washington would
prevail over anti-concurrent causation language in the policy, unless
193
the excluded peril was the "efficient proximate cause" of the loss. In
this case, and in a similar case,1 94 the Washington Supreme Court held
that an insurer could not circumvent its "efficient proximate cause"
rule through the use of anti-concurrent causation clause language
purporting to exclude any perils no matter how insignificant those
perils might have been to the Joss. 195 In dissent, Chief Justice Callow
stated, "Contrary to settled law, the majority invalidates unambiguous
language in an insurance contract without stating how it is inconsistent
with this [s]tate 's public policy." 196 What would happen to a formalist
plain meaning interpretive approach197 in assessing property insurance
coverage disputes if more courts adopted this Washington State
approach? And should such a distinction be made between efficient or
dominant causes, and insignificant causes, in anti-concurrent causation
clause exclusionary language? 198
(6)

The burden ofproofon an insurer to uphold any exclusion under
its anti-concurrent causation clause langua.ge in a property
insurance policy should at least be as ngorous as the burden of
proofon a policyholder to prove coverage under the policy.

An insured, in order to prove coverage under his or her property
insurance policy, generally must prove that a direct physical loss to the
property occurred. However, many anti-concurrent causation c~auses
193. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416-17 (Wash. 1989); see

supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
194. Villella v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1986).
195. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 415 (emphasis added) (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Hirschmann, 760 P.2d 969 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)). In footnote I of this case, the court
referred to a deposition of Safeco's "vice president of personal lines-undeiwriting": "Q.
Doesn't [the language of your lead-in exclusionary clause] attempt to exclude a cause no
matter how slight that cause may contribute to the loss? A. Yes, that's the intent." Id at 415

n.l.
196. Id at 420.
197. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
198. This author would argue in the affirmative. See infra text accompanying note
201 for my discussion on policyholder defense item (6).
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state, "We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of
the following." Thus few anti-concurrent causation clauses expressly
require that a direct dominant or efficient exclusionary clause must be
proven by the insurer, because it must normally be proven by the
insured for coverage to exist. 199
To avoid such contractual unfairness, courts should adopt a
"what's good for the goose is good for the gander" interpretive
approach to anti-concurrent causation clauses: That is to say, in any
property insurance contractual dispute involving anti-concurrent
causation clauses, in order to deny coverage effectively, the insurer also
must demonstrate that the excluded clause or clauses were dominant or
efficient direct concurrent causes, rather than indirect and insignificant
causes, similar to the insured's burden of proof for coverage involving
multiple concurrent causation.200
For example, in Buente, the plaintiffs' homeowners policy
included the following language: "We do not cover loss to covered
property . . . when: (a) there are two or more causes of loss to the
covered property; and (b) the predominant cause(s) of Joss is (are)
excluded under [l]osses ...." 201 In the absence of such express
language in the property insurance policy, however, courts should
impliedly adopt this "goose/gander" rule based on public policy
grounds. 202 Otherwise, to allow an insurer to exclude coverage based
upon indirect and insignificant causes in its anti-concurrent causation
clause language "could in theory tempt an insurer to take it to an
unreasonable extreme, which in turn could cause a court to overreact
and construe the clause too narrowly, creating an undesirable
precedent."203
Thus, if an unwary property owner is unaware of anti-concurrent
causation clause language in his or her homeowners policy, there are at
least six possible defenses that a policyholder may still raise to
counteract the exclusionary anti-concurrent causation clause language
in a property insurance policy.

199.
200.
201.
added).
202.
203.

See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hirschmann, 773 P.2d413.
Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 693 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (emphasis
See, e.g., Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 414-17.
Knox, supra note 3, at 925-26.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Property insurance coverage disputes can be extremely complex
cases when there are multiple concurrent causes in a causal chain of
events that result in a loss and when some of these concurrent causes
are covered under the insurance policy language but other concurrent
causes are excluded from coverage. To complicate matters more, there
are no fewer than three different judicial interpretive approaches
attempting to resolve this concurrent causation interpretive
conundrum.
A number of property insurance companies over the past two
decades have unilaterally addressed these insurance coverage disputes
involving concurrent causation by inserting anti-concurrent causation
clauses or similar lead-in clauses in their property insurance policy
language, in effect denying coverage to many unwary policyholders
for various losses that have multiple concurrent causes.
Some courts apply a strict textual and formalistic plain meaning
contractual interpretation to anti-concurrent causation clauses in
property insurance policies, which allows the parties to contract out of
or contract around a default dominant proximate cause approach in
concurrent causation disputes. Other courts have applied a more
contextual and functionalistic interpretive approach to anti-concurrent
causation clauses, talcing into account the reasonable expectations of
the parties and state public policy, as well as the contractual language
found in the insurance policy. I argue that a contractually based
reasonable expectations doctrine is a realistic and viable "middle
ground" interpretive approach to the strict proinsurer formalist textual
interpretation on one hand and the contextual propolicyholder
functionalistic interpretation on the other hand.
Accordingly, this Article concludes with six proposed defenses
that a policyholder may argue to counteract the onerous exclusionary
language of anti-concurrent causation clauses found in many
homeowners and other property insurance policies today. These six
policyholder defenses can be-and should be-raised in subsequent
wind-versus-water coverage disputes, including the devastating
property damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012.

